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SYMPOSIUM: BAKKE v. BOARD OF REGENTS
Foreword
George J. Alexander*
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids all men to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread-the
rich as well as the poor. Anatole France
As Anatole France suggests, equality is an elusive concept.
If society were determined to treat all equally, a great deal of
redistribution would have to take place. New employment op-
portunities and new places to live would be but a beginning.
Perhaps, as the Declaration of Independence asserts, "all men
are created equal," but once they assume their place in society,
people are subjected to great disparities depending on parental
wealth, race, exposure to education and a variety of other fac-
tors.
Some of the inequality of position in which any person
finds himself or herself is self-made. It depends on how hard
one worked at school, how eagerly one accepted responsibility
at work, how prudently one invested one's money and so forth.
A large part of the inequality, however, depends on factors
beyond a person's control. Such social disabilities as not speak-
ing English, not having had adequate educational opportuni-
ties, having parents who were deprived of intellectual oppor-
tunities and so cannot help their children find them, and, even
more particularly, having been the victim of overt racism or
ethnic bias, are group rather than self-imposed burdens.
Society inflicts burdens in many ways. Often it does so
indirectly by providing an advantage to some. For example,
when it builds good schools in wealthy suburbs or subsidizes
home construction for Caucasians, that burdens disadvantaged
groups deprived of those resources. Sometimes it does so di-
rectly-as when, at an earlier time, this country approved slav-
ery (as it presently approves cheap migrant labor in some
states). The direct burden of enslavement on specific individu-
als simultaneously provided advantage (cheap labor) to society
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
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and disadvantage to the affected individuals. It continued for
generations to provide advantage to those who benefited from
the effects of that labor. It continued to provide disadvantage
to the children and children's children of those who were bur-
dened and who passed on an impoverished inheritance.
Courts protect against only a small portion of such bur-
dens. They seem set against accepting the claims of descen-
dants of discrimination against descendants of those who bene-
fited,' for example. The principal legal tool available for what
redress exists is the equal protection clause.'
Equal protection appears designed only to prevent the pol-
itical process from favoring one group at the cost of another.
More realistically, it is designed to prevent the majority from
taking political advantage of racial minorities,' since equal pro-
tection cannot be equally applied to all classes. The Bakke
case' is itself an excellent illustration of that point. The medi-
cal school of the University of California at Davis preferred
applicants from some geographic locations to applicants from
others. It preferred persons planning to practice in certain
fields of medicine over others.5 Yet neither of these preferences
(nor any of the many others) appeared to anyone to be suspect.
And that, of course, is right. All classifications discriminate.
For example, the tax system is preferentially discriminatory as
to those who make less money and adversely discriminatory as
to those who make more. Penal laws discriminate between
those who are drunk in public and those who are drunk in the
privacy of their homes.' The placement of a new courthouse
allows some people ready access and makes others travel a
great distance. A city may decide to prohibit advertising on
some but not all trucks.7 Courts cannot and should not attempt
to make such laws equally beneficial or equally burdensome to
everyone. Instead, they should and have distinguished certain
types of rights and certain categories of claimants as more ap-
1. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
2. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAsv. L. REv. 1 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Bickel].
3. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
5. Id. at 42, 553 P.2d at 1157-58, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86.
6. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
7. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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propriate objects of their concern than others.8
Historically race has been considered an appropriate area
of judicial concern.' Originally, the race in question was, of
course, black. 0 Ample reason existed for singling out blacks for
special court solicitude. Even more reason exists when one con-
siders the present reluctance of courts to redress historic in-
jury." The California Supreme Court singled out Caucasians
for similar treatment. The articles in this symposium princi-
pally address the question of whether that selection was appro-
priate.
Professor Morris shows that the court in Bakke reached its
conclusion on the basis of a very inadequate record. Although
the majority spoke of a program that might retain Third World
presence in professional education, it examined no evidence to
contradict the claim of the defendants that the special admis-
sions program was the only available vehicle for minority pro-
fessional education. He points out that the court accepted,
arguendo, that the state might have a compelling interest in
minority education but simply never reached the question of
whether any alternative method of minority education was fea-
sible. At the least, as that portion of his article suggests, the
Bakke record is insufficiently complete to allow the United
States Supreme Court to use it as a basis for restricting special
admissions programs.
One of the questions that the record in Bakke leaves un-
touched is the question of the qualification of specially admit-
ted students. The majority opinion recognizes that present
admissions processes are not so sacrosanct that they must be
used to the exclusion of somewhat more subjective criteria such
as interviews and recommendations. It is important however to
note that, at a time when the ratio of applicants to places in
professional schools is so great, it is virtually certain that a
large number of well-qualified applicants are turned away by
all schools every year. Thus, it seems to me proper to view the
admissions process as one of selecting from among a large num-
ber of qualified applicants those that best meet the academic
objectives of the school. Many conceive of special admissions
8. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
10. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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as "lowering standards." Yet until we know a good deal more
about how to measure professional success, it appears ex-
tremely improbable that one can select-solely on the basis of
formal credentials-those applicants who will be the best doc-
tors or the best lawyers." If that is correct, is that not relevant
to a resolution of the constitutional question? Does not the use
of race as a selective criterion for admitting Third World stu-
dents become less constitutionally troublesome if other mea-
sures for selection are found to be imperfect and if those spe-
cially selected are at least "qualified" in the traditional sense?
Professor Sedler points out that while the courts have pur-
ported to apply a strict scrutiny or compelling state interest
test to racial classifications, in fact they have not had to do so.
The successful cases of racial discrimination are cases which
would have been resolved as they were by the application of the
contemporary rational relationship test when it is applied in
the field of human rights. Further, he reminds us that the
fourteenth amendment was passed as part of a trilogy of
amendments. Professor Sedler suggests that the thirteenth
amendment, which bars badges of slavery, provides a balanc-
ing factor for the interpretation of the fourteenth. Further, he
observes that the California Supreme Court was advancing
consistency rather than rational social policy in its decision in
Bakke.
Mr. Galloway and Mr. Hewitt carefully retrace the steps
which led to the strict scrutiny test. They point to the concern
of the Court in Carolene Products'3 that equal protection has
special application to the politically impotent and conclude
that, while the strict scrutiny test might appropriately apply
to minority groups, it cannot be applied as the Supreme Court
of California applied it to benefit whites.
In addition to the comments made by the three authors,
with whom I agree, it seems to me worth noting that Carolene
Products might lead to a reversal of the California Supreme
12. See, e.g., the articles cited by the Bakke dissent (18 Cal. 3d at 84 nn.13-14,
553 P.2d at 1186 nn.13-14, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 714 nn.13-14): D. Hoer, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COLLEGE GRADES AND ADULT ACHIEVEMENT 30 (1963); Gough, Evaluation of
Performance in Medical Training, 39 J. MED. ED. 679 (1964); Haley & Lerner, The
Characteristics and Performance of Medical Students During Preclinical Training, 47
J. MED. ED. 446 (1972); Price, Measurement of Physician Performance, 39 J. MED. ED.
203, 211 (1964); Rhoades, Motivation, Medical School Admissions and Student
Performance, 49 J. MED. ED. 1119, 1125 (1974); Turner, Predictors of Clinical
Performance, 49 J. MED. ED. 338 (1974).
13. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Court for yet another reason. As Professor Galloway and Mr.
Hewitt note, the Carolene Products standard for strict scrutiny
is political impotence. As their article also points out, that
portion of the Carolene Products rationale has survived.'"
Bakke's claim is premised on what was probably always an
overstatement: that all racial classifications require strict scru-
tiny. Only that racial classification which classifies minority
groups to their disadvantage requires strict scrutiny. 5
Accepting, however, the broader formulation which sur-
vived, it seems possible now to argue that race is no longer a
suspect classification whether the classification pertains to
minorities or to whites. To be sure, when the fourteenth
amendment was ratified, blacks needed special protection
against majoritarian society and had only limited political in-
fluence.' 6 It is still true that blacks (and for that matter all
Third World people) are a minority of society. Being a minority
should not, however, suffice for strict scrutiny. Most pieces of
legislation create minorities who are treated more harshly than
are majoritarian interests under the statute. The question for
them, and, I submit, for Third World people, is whether the
political disadvantage represented at any given point is neces-
sarily indicative of how they will be treated in other respects.'7
If any of the minorities (including now the Third World minori-
ties) can count on a coalition of their own membership and
14. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Frontiero v. Ri-
chardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974).
16. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Bickel, supra note 3.
17. Justice Mosk notes that the assumption that the "white" race is not in need
of the constitutional protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment is a misconcep-
tion. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 50 n.16, 553 P.2d
at 1163 n.16, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691 n.16. "Whites" in fact do not constitute a monolithic
political force. Politically, the majority at any one time is made up of a number of
pluralistic groups engaged in a temporary alliance for a given purpose. These same
groups may, and often do, find themselves opposed to one another on a different issue
at a later time.
The fact that our society was to be a pluralistic one, with each group therein
interested mainly in serving its own "interests," was foreseen by John Adams 180 years
ago, He considered the ethic of self-interest to be a loss of "integrity" and warned that
in such a society it is only laws and their institutions which offer the hope of freedom
for "minorities" of the moment from the "majority" of the moment. See J. HOWE,
JR.,THE CHANGING PouicAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMs 160 passim (1966). As Justice
Mosk implies above, the fourteenth amendment was enacted to serve precisely the
function of preservation and protection that Adams saw as necessary in a society such
as ours.
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those sympathetic to them to represent their interests ade-
quately, then they may be disadvantaged by any piece of
legislation, but they have lost their claim to political impot-
ence.
Anyone who views the civil rights acts starting in 1964 and
running to date"5 must believe that Third World people and
those sympathetic to them have lost their political impotence.
The United States Supreme Court made Congress a more effec-
tive avenue for redress of Third World grievances by its inter-
pretation of section five of the fourteenth amendment permit-
ting Congress to initiate ways to legislate equality under the
law." Indeed, Congress is in a unique position to pass legisla-
tion authorizing the kind of admissions program that is chal-
lenged in Bakke.2 1 Furthermore, given its history of legislative
enactment requiring affirmative action, it seems quite possible
that Congress will take that initiative.
2
'
Even accepting the necessity of applying the Carolene
Products analysis equally to majoritarian and minority racial
concerns, the historical reason for strict scrutiny (as opposed
to ordinary scrutiny) no longer seems relevant. Under a ra-
tional relationship test,22 it appears to the authors in this sym-
posium and to me that the Davis Medical School program
18. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 437
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa to 1973bb-4 (1970)); The Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 245, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970)); The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79
Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973p (1970)); The Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. 1. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970)).
19. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
20. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII-Equal Employment Op-
portunity), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
15 (1970)).
21. Another measure of the political power of Third World groups is the often
repeated claim that the black vote was instrumental in electing Jimmy Carter to the
presidency. The fact that Carter received 92% of the black vote in one of the closest
presidential races ever is not only domestically, but internationally, given great weight
in speculating on the Carter administration's future policies. For example, in a report
from South Africa it was stated:
Many South Africans say they see the handwriting on the wall.
They are convinced that Carter, because of the heavy election sup-
port he received from blacks in America, will exert strong political and
economic pressure on the South African Government to ease its policy of
strict racial separation . ...
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 31, 1977, at 32.
22. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther].
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would escape constitutional censure.
To drive home the meaning of racial discrimination, I an-
nually tell an apocryphal story to my Constitutional Law class.
In it, a southern school chief is summoned to court to explain
why all black school children are still attending black schools.
He says that he attempted to comply with the federal mandate
to desegreate by giving all school children a form on which they
could request a transfer and asked only that they list their
reason. While a large number of black school children did apply
for transfer they all listed as their reason that they wanted to
go to white schools. Consequently, he pointed out, he could
transfer none of them because he knew that he was not consti-
tutionally permitted to transfer students on account of race. I
wonder whether the Bakke decision does not, in large part,
adopt the logic of that school chief.
One interesting facet of the Bakke litigation concerns the
courts hearing the case. The decision is the first decision by the
supreme court of any state barring affirmative action in school
admission. Yet it comes from a court generally considered to
be among the most liberal in the country. The absolute stan-
dard which it applies (strict scrutiny) comes from another
court (the United States Supreme Court in Chief Justice War-
ren's time) which contributed most of the precedents for strict
scrutiny." It will be heard (if it is heard on the merits) by the
present Supreme Court which, under Chief Justice Burger, has
been reluctant to apply equal protection with the same vigor.24
The Burger Court has refused to apply strict scrutiny standards
and has held, in cases that would appear to call for strict scru-
tiny, that rational relationship suffices to condemn the practice
in question." They have developed new doctrines, such as the
doctrine of irrebutable presumption, to avoid equal protection
inquiries entirely. Some commentators have found, in the
issue-selective manner in which the Burger Court has ap-
proached constitutional law, a return to a substantive due pro-
cess approach.26 Curiously, a substantive due process approach
(or in any event one less wedded to doctrinal consistency)
23. Id. See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
655 (1969).
24. Gunther, supra note 22.
25. Id. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's concurring opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167, 171 (1973), and Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973).
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would seem to militate strongly for a reversal of the decision
in Bakke.
Since Bakke presents a state system that is far less outra-
geous (to say the least) than the system of enforced segregation
reviewed in many of the prior cases, the Burger Court seems
in a better position than was the Warren Court to act in favor
of the affirmative action program at Davis. While it appears
unlikely that the Court would review and approve the special
admissions program at Davis, it is within the realm of possibil-
ity that the Court would decide that the program should be
judged by a standard more permissive than strict scrutiny. 7
Once announcing that the test which the California court ap-
plied was the wrong one, the United States Supreme Court
would then be in a position to reverse and remand the case.
Freed of the necessity of applying the compelling state interest
test, the Supreme Court of California might very well reverse
itself.m
27. Gunther, supra note 22.
28. See Justice Tobriner's dissenting opinion in Bakke v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 700 (1976).
[Vol. 17
